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I want to object to a growing tendency, evident at this symposium,
to recognize and to applaud a division of legal scholarship into two
branches. Professor Fletcher distinguishes "committed argument" from
"detached observation." Professor Posner distinguishes doctrinal analy-
sis from analysis by the methods of social science. Professor Kronman
distinguishes lawyerly advocacy from the scholarly pursuit of truth.
These several dichotomies are not identical, but they seem to have
a common theme-the idea that some legal scholarship resembles the
work of lawyers and judges, and some more closely resembles the
work of other academics.
There is no doubt a tension in law schools between our ties to
the legal profession and our scholarly aspirations. The tension affects
every choice an academic lawyer makes about work: what courses to
teach, and how to organize them; what questions to ask in research;
what is interesting, what is worth doing. Those who choose lawyerly
argument question the value of the flight to other disciplines. Those
who choose economic or philosophical or historical studies question
the value of "mere" doctrinal analysis. Each group damns the other
by praising technical competence, by implication competence at a
task barely worth doing.
It seems to me unacceptable to let this tension bifurcate the law
school. For me the special character of the law school, its unique
power, is its location in the middle ground. We train lawyers, but
the same people who train lawyers also think and write about law.
In both parts of our work, we are trying to improve the rules and
the machinery and the operation of law. Of course, we don't all agree
on what counts as an improvement. Law might be improved if it is
more intelligible, more easily administered, more internally consis-
tent, more efficient in the pursuit of its stated goals, more efficient
in the pursuit of some specified goals, more consistent with tradition,
or with specified principles of justice or morality. But I think we
all share the aspiration to improve law as one result of our scholar-
ship. And that aspiration, that real possibility, is, or should be, an
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important and energizing feature of our work.
Professor Fletcher seems to share my concern for integrating law-
yerly argument and academic inquiry. His scholar engaged in "com-
mitted argument" is engaged in precisely that integrating activity,
attempting to discern sound principles of law and to assist the com-
munity of lawyers and judges in that task. But he insists on reserving
that sort of scholarship for people with what he calls a "transcendental"
view of the nature and sources of law. For a scholar with a positivist
view of law, he suggests that the principal legitimate activity is "de-
tached observation." Professor Fletcher concedes that a positivist legal
scholar might argue, as law reformer, about what the law ought to be,
but he insists that only a transcendentalist can engage in "committed
argument" about what the law is, and that there is a significant dif-
ference between the two activities.
I think it plain that committed participation in the legal process
is open to all legal scholars, and I cannot understand why Professor
Fletcher would limit it to scholars of his particular persuasion. He
explains by pointing to two ways in which the transcendental view
of law offers scholars a more substantial role than does the positivist
view of law. Transcendentalist scholars, he claims, have a broad range
of permissible sources for argument about law, including appeals to
the structure of law, to principles of justice, and to history; by con-
trast, positivist reformers are limited to utilitarian considerations as
the sole source of argument. Furthermore, he claims, the transcen-
dental view gives the arguments of scholars a more authoritative role
in the legal process than does the positivist view. But neither point,
if true, would exclude the positivist from participation in the legal
process. More fundamentally, neither point is correct.
Arguments from history, from the internal structure of the legal
system, and from conceptions of justice are not reserved for transcen-
dental scholars who argue about what law is. Such arguments are
equally available, and obviously useful, to positivist scholars who
argue about how law should be interpreted, or what law should be.
A positivist view of law does not limit scholars, either in principle
or in practice, to utilitarian arguments.
As for the authoritative role of the scholar, it is equally limited
on either conception of law. Judges are no more bound by scholarly
claims about what the law is than by scholarly claims about what the
law ought to be. But judges who must decide questions of law, whether
on one theory or the other, invite scholars to assist them. I share with
Professor Fletcher the view that legal scholars ought to accept the
invitation.
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Legal scholars, of course, are not the only people who aspire to
improve law. Many practicing lawyers and government officials share
that aspiration, but they are constrained by obligations to other clients
or to the institutions they serve. And many academics in other fields
aspire to improve law, but they have less opportunity to do so, be-
cause they lack the authority that the law schools command in the
world of lawyers, and perhaps more important, they lack the arm;es
of students who will move from their classrooms into the operating
positions in the legal system. We in the law schools are uniquely
situated: we are informed by the concerns of the profession, and our
voices carry some authority in the world of lawyers, but we are free
of obligations to clients or institutions. That distinctive situation,
which is a source of energy and power for most of us, requires for its
survival that we maintain the tension between law and academic in-
quiry, and refuse to let it split us apart.
That tension comes partly from the nature of our task. But it is
strongly reinforced by the biography of most legal academics. Almost
all of us once made a decision against the academy. We decided to
go to law school and become lawyers, instead of going to graduate
school and becoming professors. At some later time, we reversed that
decision and became academics after all. Unlike academics in other
fields, almost all of us came late to the decision, after having earlier
decisively rejected it. That biographical fact about law teachers, I
think, has reinforced the identity of the law school as an institution
uniquely situated between the world of lawyers and the other aca-
demic departments. The tension between law and academic inquiry
exists not only in the institution, but in the lives of each of us.
The prevalence of people with that distinctive history may be de-
clining. More people may now enter law school intending to make
a career in the academy. As such people enter law teaching, free of
the pull toward the world of the practicing lawyer, they may be in-
clined to mark off a split between the academic and the lawyerly
wings of the faculty, rather than incorporating both parts in them-
selves. That would change the nature of legal scholarship, and in
my view for the worse. Extreme professionalism can find a home in
the law firms. Scholarship in economics, philosophy, or other dis-
ciplines can fit comfortably in other academic departments. But only
a law school can house and encourage people whose central concern
is to think about law with the hope of improving it, attentive to the
concerns of the profession, and without obligation to any client or
any institution.
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